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Abstract
We show that all the fundamental properties of competitive equilibrium in
Marshall’s cardinal theory of value, as presented in Note XXI of the mathematical
appendix to his Principles of Economics (1890), derive from the Strong Law
of Demand. That is, existence, uniqueness, optimality, and global stability of
equilibrium prices with respect to tatonnement price adjustment follow from the
cyclical monotonicity of the market demand function in the Marshallian general
equilibrium model.
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1 Introduction
Marshall in NOTE XXI of the mathematical appendix to his Principles of Economics
(1890) presents a fully articulated theory of general equilibrium in market economies.
This is not the partial equilibrium model with only two goods usually associated
with Cournot (1838), Dupuit (1844) or Marshall (1890), nor is it the partial equilib-
rium model exposited in the first chapter of Arrow and Hahn (1971), or in chapter
10 of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (MWG) (1995). Marshall’s general equilib-
rium model differs in several essential respects from the general equilibrium model of
Walras (1900). In Marshall’s model there are no explicit budget constraints for con-
sumers, the marginal utilities of incomes are exogenous constants and market prices
are not normalized. He “proves” the existence of market clearing prices, as does
Walras, by counting the number of equations and unknowns. Marshall’s first order
conditions for consumer satisfaction require the gradient of the consumer’s utility
function to equal the vector of market prices.
A recent modern exposition of the fundamental properties of Marhsall’s general
equilibrium model in NOTE XXI can be found in sections 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 of Bewley
(2007), where he calls it “short-run equilibrium.”As in Marshall, there are no explicit
∗We are pleased to thank Truman Bewley, Ben Polak, Mike Todd, and Francoise Forges for their
helpful remarks. This is a revision of CFDP 1615.
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budget constraints for consumers, the marginal utilities of incomes are exogenous
constants and market prices are not normalized. Consumers in Bewley’s model satisfy
Marshall’s first order conditions in a short-run equilibrium. Bewley proves that: (i)
a unique short-run equilibrium exists, (ii) welfare in a short-run equilibrium can
be computed using the consumer surplus of a representative consumer and (iii) the
short-run equilibrium is globally stable under tatonnment price adjustment.
We show that the fundamental properties of competitive equilibrium in Marshall’s
theory of value as derived in Bewley are immediate consequences of the market de-
mand function satisfying the Strong Law of Demand, introduced by Brown and Cal-
samiglia (2007). A demand function is said to satisfy the Strong Law of Demand
if it is a cyclically monotone function of market prices. Cyclically monotone de-
mand functions not only have downward sloping demand curves, in the sense that
they are monotone functions of market prices, but also their line integrals are path-
independent and hence provide an exact measure of the change in consumer’s welfare
in terms of consumer’s surplus for a given multidimensional change in market prices.
This is an immediate consequence of Roy’s identity applied to the indirect utility func-
tion for quasilinear utilities, where the marginal utility of income is one. Following
Quah (2000), we show that the Strong Law of Demand is preserved under aggrega-
tion across consumers. Hence the area under the market demand curve is an exact
measure of the change in aggregate consumer welfare for a given multidimensional
change in market prices.
Brown and Calsamiglia prove that a consumer’s demand function satisfies the
Strong Law of Demand, iff the consumer behaves as if she were maximizing a quasi-
linear utility function subject to a budget constraint. The defining cardinal property
of quasilinear utilities, say for two goods, is that the indifference curves are parallel.
Consequently, quasilinear utility is measured on an interval scale. It is in this sense
that Marshall’s general equilibrium model is a cardinal theory of value, where differ-
ences in a consumer’s quasilinear utility levels are a proxy for the consumer’s intensity
of preferences. The assumption of maximizing a quasilinear utility function subject
to a budget constraint is made by MWG in their discussion of partial equilibrium
analysis in the two good case, but there is no explicit mention of the Strong Law of
Demand in their analysis. In Bewley’s discussion of short-run equilibrium, there is
no explicit mention of the Strong Law of Demand or maximizing a quasilinear utility
function subject to a budget constraint.
Brown and Matzkin (1996) define an economic model as refutable if there exists
a finite data set consistent with the model and a second finite data set that falsifies
the model, where the model is the solution to a finite family of multivariate poly-
nomial inequalities. The unknowns in the inequalities are unobservable theoretical
constructs such as utility levels and marginal utilities of income. The parameters
in the inequalities are observable market quantities such as market prices, aggregate
demands and the income distribution. Using Bewley’s (1980) characterization of
the short-run equilibrium model as a representative agent model – see also sections
8.5 and 8.6 of his monograph – we propose a refutable model of Marshall’s cardi-
nal theory of value. That is, there exists a finite family of multivariate polynomial
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inequalities, the Afriat inequalities for quasilinear utilities derived by Brown and Cal-
samiglia, where the parameters are the market prices and aggregate demands and the
unknowns are the utility levels and marginal utilities of income of the representative
consumer. Brown and Calsamiglia show that these inequalities have a solution iff the
finite data set consisting of observations on market prices and associated aggregate
market demands is cyclically monotone.
The fundamental difference between the Marshallian and Walrasian theories of
value is the measurement scale for utility levels of consumers. In the Marshallian
model the measurement scale is cardinal, more precisely an interval scale, where the
family of indifference curves is a metric space isometric to the positive real line. That
is, fix any open interval, I ≡ (x̄,+∞) ∈ R2++ and assume that the quasilinear utility
function U(x, y) = v(x) + y on R2++ is smooth, monotone and strictly concave. If
(x̄, ȳ) ∈ I then define
Φ(ȳ) ≡ {(x, y) ∈ R2++ : U(x, y) = U(x̄, ȳ)},
i.e., the unique indifference curve of U(x, y) passing through (x̄, ȳ). Φ is a one-to-one
map from the metric space I onto Γ[U ], the family of indifference curves for U . As
such, Φ induces a metric on Γ[U ], where if (α, β) ∈ Γ[U ]× Γ[U ], then
dist(α, β) ≡
∣∣(Φ−1(α)− Φ−1(β)∣∣ .
That is, Φ−1 is an isometric imbedding of Γ[U ] into R++. Of course, this metric
representation extends to quasilinear utilities on RN+1++ of the form
U(x, y) = v(x) + y where x ∈ RN++ and y ∈ R++.
That is, Φ−1 is an isometric imbedding of Γ[U ] into R++.
In the Walrasian model, the measurement scale for utility levels is an ordinal
scale, where only properties of consumer demand derivable from indifference curves
are admissible in the Walrasian model, e.g., the marginal utility of income is not
an admissible property. Ordinal scales are suffi cient for characterizing exchange effi -
ciency in terms of Pareto optimality or compensating variation or equivalent variation.
Unfortunately, a meaningful discussion of distributive equity requires interpersonal
comparisons of aggregate consumer welfare. If there is a representative consumer
endowed with a quasilinear utility function, then the equity of interpersonal changes
in aggregate consumer welfare is reduced to intrapersonal changes in the consumer
surplus of the representative consumer. Hence notions of distributional equity are
well defined and exact in the Marshallian cardinal theory of value.
We argue that rationalizing consumer demand with quasilinear cardinal utility
functions is comparable to rationalizing consumer demand with neoclassical ordinal
utility functions. In the latter case Afriat (1967) proved that neoclassical rational-
ization is refutable and in the former case, we extended his analysis to show that
quasilinear rationalization is also refutable. Hence in both cases, the debate about
the effi cacy of either the cardinal or ordinal model of utility maximization subject to
a budget constraint has been reduced to an empirical question that is resolvable in
polynomial time using market data.
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For ease of exposition we limit most of our discussion to pure exchange models
but, as suggested by the analysis short-run equilibrium in Bewley, all of our results
extend to Marshall’s general equilibrium model with production.
2 A Cardinal Theory of Value
For completeness, we recall Afriat’s seminal (1967) theorem on rationalizing consumer
demand data (pr, xr), r = 1, 2, ..., N , with an ordinal utility function and the Brown—
Calsamiglia (2007) extension of Afriat’s theorem to rationalizing consumer demand
data with a cardinal utility function, i.e., a quasilinear utility function. Afriat showed
that the finite set of observations of market prices and consumer demands at those
prices can be rationalized by an ordinal utility function iff there exists a concave, con-
tinuous, non-satiated utility function that rationalizes the data. That is, there exists




Moreover, this rationalization is equivalent to two other conditions: (1) The “Afriat
inequalities”:
Uj ≤ Uk + λkpk · (xj − xk) for j, k = 1, 2, ..., N
are solvable for utility levels Ur and marginal utilities of income λr and (2) the data
satisfies cyclical consistency, a combinatorial condition that generalizes the strong law
of revealed preference to allow thick indifference curves. See Varian (1982) for proofs.
Brown and Calsamiglia showed that the data can be rationalized by a quasilinear util-
ity function iff the Afriat inequalities have a solution where the λr = 1. Moreover,
they show that quasilinear rationalization is equivalent to another combinatorial con-
dition on the data, cyclical monotonicity. Rockafellar (1970) introduced the notion of
cyclical monotonicity as a means of characterizing the subgradient correspondence of
a convex function. For smooth strictly concave functions f the gradient map ∂f(x)
is cylically monotone if for all finite sequences (pt, xt)Tt=1, where pt = ∂f(xt):
x1 · (p2 − p1) + x2 · (p3 − p3) + · · ·+ xT · (p1 − pT ) ≥ 0.
Hildenbrand’s (1983) extension of the law of demand to multicommodity market
demand functions requires the demand function to be monotone. He showed that it is
monotone if the income distribution is price independent and has downward sloping
density. Subsequently, Quah (2000) extended Hildenbrand’s analysis to individual’s
demand functions. His suffi cient condition for monotone individual demand is in
terms of the income elasticity of the marginal utility of income. Assuming that the
commodity space is Rn++, we denote the demand function at prices p ∈ Rn++ by x(p).
This demand function satisfies the law of demand or is monotone if for any pair
p, p′ ∈ Rn++ of prices
(p− p′) · [x(p)− x(p′)] < 0.
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This means, in particular, that the demand curve of any good is downward sloping
with respect to its own price, i.e., satisfies the law of demand if all other prices are





gi(xi)− p · xi
where gi is a smooth, strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function on Rn++,
λi is the exogenous marginal utility of income, p is the vector of market prices and
xi is the consumption bundle. In this model there are no budget constraints and
prices are not normalized. This specification of the consumer’s optimization problem
rationalizes the family of equations defining Marshall’s general equilibrium model
(absent production) in his NOTE XXI.
Theorem 1 If there are I consumers, where each consumer i’s optimization problem
is given by (M), then the market demand function satisfies the Strong Law of Demand.
Proof. Let hi(p) = 1λi gi(xi(p)) − p · xi(p) be the optimal value function for (M)
for consumer i. Applying the envelope theorem we know that ∂hi(p) = −xi(p).Let
H(p) =
∑I




i=1−xi(p). Therefore the mar-
ket demand at prices p is X(p) =
∑I
i=1 xi(p) = −
∑I
i=1 ∂hi(p) = −∂H(p). Since
−hi(p) is a concave function, −∂hi(p) and −∂H(p) are cyclically monotone – see
Theorem 24.8 in Rockafellar (1970). Hence, the market demand function X(p) satis-
fies the Strong Law of Demand.
Corollary 2 The Marshallian general equilibrium model has a unique equilibrium
price vector that is globally stable under tatonnment price adjustment.
Proof. Every cyclically monotone map is a monotone map. That is, market demand
functions satisfying the Strong Law of Demand a fortiori satisfy the Law of Demand.
Hildenbrand (1983) shows that economies satisfying the Law of Demand have a unique
equilibrium price vectors that are globally stable under tatonnment price adjustment.
Corollary 3 Aggregate consumer welfare in the Marshallian general equilibrium model
can be computed using consumer surplus.
Proof. Brown and Brown (2007) show that this is a property of cyclically monotone
demand functions. To prove that the Marshallian general equilibrium model is
refutable, we will first show that it can be described as a representative agent model,
as originally suggested by Bewley (1980). The representative agent’s utility function
in Bewley’s Marshallian model is given by the following social welfare function:














Bewley shows that (p̄, x(p̄)) is an equilibrium of the exchange economy with con-
sumers {(gi, λi)}Ii=1 and social endowment ē iff
ē = arg max
e∈RN++
{W (e)− p̄e}.
Equivalently, for a given ē, the price vector p̄ such that ē = arg maxe∈RN++{W (e)− p̄e}
will be the unique competitive equilibrium price vector for this exchange economy.
























xt(p̄) = x(p̄) = e.
The equilibrium map p(e) is again the inverse of the demand function of the repre-
sentative consumer. From Rockafellar (1970, p. 219), Corollary 23.5.1 we know that
if g is a continuous concave function on RI++ then p ∈ ∂g(x) iff x ∈ −∂h(p). It
follows from this duality relationship that p̄ is the unique equilibrium price vector
for the social endowment ē if and only if p̄ = (∂W/∂e)|e=ē and −(∂H/∂p)|p̄ = ē.
Given a finite set of observations on social endowments and market clearing prices,
we can now characterize the refutable implications of Marshall’s theory of value. A
given data set rationalizes Marshall’s general equilibrium model if and only if it is
cyclically monotone.
Theorem 4 The equilibrium map, p(e), in Marshall’s general equilibrium model is
cyclically monotone in e, the social endowment.
Proof. Because gi is strictly concave, W (e) is strictly concave as well. By Theorem
24.8 in Rockafellar (1970) we know that the gradient map of a concave function is
cyclically monotone, which implies that the gradient map ~e → (∂W/∂e)|e=ē = p̄ is
cyclically monotone.
All of our results: existence, uniqueness, optimality, tatonnment stability and
refutability extend to the Marshallian general equilibrium model with production.
Optimality, tatonnment stability and refutability follow from the well-known dual-
ity result in convex analysis that the supply function is the gradient of the profit
function or conjugate of the cost function. As such, the supply function is also cycli-
cally monotone .The cyclical monotonicity of aggregate supply and aggregate demand
guarantee (i) that producer and consumer surplus are well defined, (ii) that the excess
demand function is cyclically monotone and (iii) that the aggregate demand function
and the aggregate supply function are refutable. As in Bewley (2007), existence is
shown by maximizing the representative agent’s utility function over the compact
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set of feasible production plans. If this set is strictly convex then the optimum is
unique and the supporting prices are the equilibrium prices. See Bewley’s chapter
8 on short-run equilibria for detailed proofs of existence, uniqueness, optimality and
tatonnment stability. Refutability follows from Brown and Calsamiglia.
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